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Abstract
Under the pressure of a growing capital outflow, by the end of 2013 the 
Argentine government implemented what was known as the tax on "luxury 
cars". Even when not explicitly declared, the main objective was to reduce 
imports of most expensive cars to reduce the trade deficit of the automotive 
sector, which was contributing heavily to the capital account deficit. Even 
when the policy could be categorized as "successful" in terms of reducing 
a USD 4.5 billion deficit in 2013 to one of just over USD 0.7 billion in 
2014, it had a devastating and lasting impact on the internal market, that 
just in 2013 had achieved a record in sales. We obtain that during the first 
year of the implementation of the tax, the overall impact on sales of models 
reached by the tax was 53.7%. Despite some differences, the negative im-
pact took place throughout the whole year. Not surprisingly, cars reached by 
the highest tax rate were most affected, as well as carmakers that produce 
more expensive varieties. However, even when the measure may have been 
designed to have a direct impact on a small part of the market, the negative 
effects extended to the whole market.
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Resumen
Bajo la presión de una creciente salida de capitales, a fines del año 2013 
el gobierno argentino implementó lo que se conoció como el impuesto a los 
"autos de lujo". Aunque no declarado explícitamente, el objetivo principal 
era reducir las importaciones de los automóviles más caros para reducir el 
déficit comercial del sector automotriz, que contribuía de manera impor-
tante al déficit de la cuenta de capital. Más allá del hecho de que la política 
podría calificarse de "exitosa" en cuanto a la reducción de un déficit de 
USD 4.500 millones en 2013 a uno de poco más de USD 700 millones en 
2014, tuvo un impacto devastador y duradero en el mercado interno, que 
apenas un año antes, en 2013, había alcanzado un récord de ventas. Los re-
sultados muestran que durante el primer año de la aplicación del impuesto, 
el impacto global en las ventas de los modelos alcanzados por el mismo fue 
del 53,7%. A pesar de algunas diferencias, el impacto negativo se produjo a 
lo largo todo el año 2014. No sorprende que los automóviles alcanzados por 
la tasa del 50% fueran los más afectados, así como los fabricantes de mo-
delos más caros. Sin embargo, incluso cuando la medida puede haber sido 
diseñada para tener un impacto directo en una pequeña parte del mercado, 
los efectos negativos se extendieron a la totalidad del mismo.
Palabras clave: Impuesto Interno, Sector Automotriz, Evaluación de Impac-
to, Argentina.
Código JEL: A10, D04, H20.
I. Introduction
By the end of November 2011, and after a deepening in the rate 
of capital outflows, the Argentine government started to implement a set 
policy measures directed to restrict access to foreign currencies, and espe-
cially to reduce capital outflows. The main measure was known as "cepo 
cambiario", which meant the need to obtain a previous authorization to buy 
foreign currency, imposing increasing restrictions on imports, the sending 
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of profits abroad, etc. Later other measures followed, such as the implemen-
tation of non-automatic import licenses.1 Despite these and other measures, 
the Capital Account of the Balance of Payment continued to deteriorate. 
Even more, the difficulties in access to the foreign currency market have a 
negative effect on the evolution of exports, especially from sectors highly 
dependent on imported inputs. 
In December 2013, the government implemented yet another 
measure. Law 26929 established an internal tax on the sales of cars whose 
producer prices were above two thresholds: $A 170 thousand and $A 210 
thousand.2 Even when it was not a measure designed to directly impact on 
the foreign currency market, the idea behind it was to reduce substantially 
the sales of the most expensive cars, which were, in most cases, imported 
from abroad, representing a small share of the automotive market. 
In terms of its impact on the currency trade balance, we could say 
that the measure was a success, reducing the foreign trade deficit of the au-
tomotive sector3 from USD 4.5 billion in 2013 to one of just USD 0.7 billion 
in 2014. This change was the result of a massive reduction in imports, from 
USD 15 billion in 2013 to USD 9.5 billion in 2014, but also an important 
reduction in exports by USD 1.8 billion. Among other reasons behind this 
turnaround was the reduction in the overall economic activity, and not least 
the increasing difficulties in importing intermediate inputs, on which the 
automotive sector is highly dependent.
However, the implementation of the tax had also devastating and 
lasting impacts on the whole market, with a reduction in sales of new cars by 
almost 31% in 2014 and a further 8.3% in 2015, and with production drop-
ping by 28.2% and 15.1%4 respectively. The magnitude of the fall in sales is 
evident from Figure 1, with a reduction of 47.5% in the case of car models 
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1.These were known as "Declaración jurada anticipada de importación" (Early affidavit import), 
which by mid-2015 were declared in violation of WTO regulations. From January 2016 they 
are not in force.
2. About USD 27000 and USD 33000 respectively, at the moment of the Law being passed. These 
thresholds were updated at the end of 2014, and once again in June 2015 distinguishing also 
between domestically produced and foreign models.
3. Code 34 of the International Standard Industry Classification (Revision 3): Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers.
4. This figure excludes the production by one unidentified car maker.
for which the tax reached at least one variety, however, sales of unreached 
car models also dropped by 26.8%, while for exempted vehicles there was a 
reduction of 17.3%. Figure 2 shows clearly that after the implementation of 
the new tax rates, reached varieties fell much abruptly than unreached ones 
did. From Figure 2 we can observe that both series exhibit a quite similar 
temporal pattern before the implementation of the new tax rates. 
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An interesting pattern arises when we look at the evolution of prices. 
As Table 1 reports, all prices started to increase as soon after the new tax 
rates were in force, with prices of varieties reached by the car doing at a 
faster pace. However, by the end of 2014 prices of unreached varieties have 
increased almost in the same percentage of those varieties subject to the 
30% tax rate. This result may find its explanation in the fact that as the new 
tax rates came into force, carmakers saw an opportunity to also increase 
the prices of cars which were not taxed because their prices fell below the 
reference values, but which were the closest substitutes for those affected 
by the 30% rate. As 2014 progressed, the evolution of the average price of 
the car models that were not reached by the tax meant a reduction of the 
price gap generated at the beginning of the implementation of the tax with 
respect to the models for which some of their varieties were reached by the 
different tax rates. This pattern may help explaining why as the new tax rates 
were implemented, the entire market experienced an astonishing reduction 
in sales, and not only those varieties reached by the new rates.
Figure 1: Annual growth rate of sales of 0 Km vehicles: 2014
(*) The tax reached at least one variety of the car model in 2014.
(**) Trucks, heavy trucks, and other heavy vehicles.
Source: own calculations based on ACARA.
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Figure 2: three-month moving average sales
Source: own calculations based on ACARA.
Unreached
Reached (tax rate)
0/30/50%(*) 30% 50%
January 2014 3.6 33.5 22.7 90.3
February 2014 19.9 62.8 37.4 116.1
March 2014 23.8 75.5 35.4 118.0
April 2014 24.9 74.9 36.6 121.4
May-14 24.9 66.7 37.3 122.5
June 2014 27.7 72.3 38.7 119.2
July 2014 28.6 73.3 39.3 120.0
August 2014 30.3 74.3 42.0 123.5
September 2014 34.7 76.8 43.7 125.8
October 2014 36.5 76.5 44.8 127.2
November 2014 40.6 81.5 45.4 128.6
December 2014 48.2 86.2 46.0 129.9
Table 1: average percentage change in prices (w.r.t. December 2013)
(*) It includes car models whose varieties during the year 2014 were reached by 
different tax rates.
Source: own calculations based on ACARA.
Were these side effects on the rest of the sector unforeseen by policy 
makers? Even when there is no direct answer to this question, we believe 
that in the light of other policies pursued by economic policymakers at the 
time, a positive response could be an educated guess. The reason behind this 
assertion is that if we look at the set of policies implemented over several 
years, it would seem that there was an (implicit?) understanding that the 
economic system works as separate compartments, with an astonishing ina-
bility, on the edge of even malpractice to recognize that agents and markets 
in an economy are parts of an interrelated system.
The objective of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, to quantify, 
through the use of some standard econometric techniques, the impact the 
implementation of the tax "on luxury cars" had on sales, both on car models 
directly reached by the tax as well as on those that were not directly affected. 
On the other hand, to raise awareness on the importance of proper design 
of policy measures. As we show later, the case under analysis, whose inten-
tion was originally directed to affect only a small and specific part of the 
automotive market, had a devastating impact on the entire sector. The next 
section briefly discusses the dataset we work with, while in section 3 we lay 
out the empirical approach and present the results. Section 4 is of summary 
and conclusions.
II. Data
Using two separate datasets for cars 0 Km, one with monthly in-
formation on sales and the other with monthly information on prices5, we 
managed to build up a new and until now unavailable database for the period 
January 2013 to December 2014.6  The comparison of these two years is 
quite informative for our purposes because after that the most important 
part of the world economic crisis that began at the end of 2008 was over, the 
domestic car market experienced an important upward tendency reaching in 
2013 a record of sales7, dropping abruptly in 2014 during the first of the two 
years the new tax was in force. 
5. Prices are "suggested sale prices" by car makers to car dealerships. There is no information on 
prices actually set by car dealerships. 
6. We thanks the collaboration of ACARA (Asociación de Concesionarios de Automotores de la 
República Argentina) for the provision of the raw data.
7. With a minor proportion of models produced locally, especially for high-brand models, this exp-
lains in part the magnitude of the foreign trade deficit experienced by the sector in 2013.
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8. The impossibility of working at a greater level of detail most likely means that our estimates are 
underestimating the true magnitude of the negative impact.
In both datasets, we have information on the carmaker, the car mod-
el, and within each model the different varieties. However, we need to deal 
with some issues that do not allow us to merge the two datasets directly at 
the variety level. The first issue is that either because of real changes or 
marketing policies, the identification of vehicles at the variety level changes 
substantially over time, so, in many cases, it is not possible to have data for 
the entire period for a given variety. The second issue is that the definitions 
of the varieties by carmakers are not necessarily identical to the ones avail-
able on the sales dataset, with the latter determined by the official denomi-
nation at the moment the car is registered after being sold. Because of these 
two problems, we are forced to work at the car model level.8  
With prices set at the level of variety, and so if whether the tax 
reached a variety, there is a need to decide how to deal with those cases 
where some varieties of a car model fell under the tax, while others did not, 
and also when some varieties were reached by the rate of 30%, while others 
by the rate of 50%. Here we adopt two alternative criteria:
i) in a given month of 2014 we identify a car model as reached by the 
tax if at least one variety fell under the tax, either with the 30% or 50% rate,
ii) in a given month of 2014 we distinguish between models fully 
and partially reached, as well as in function of the applied tax rate. In this 
way, we work with three groups:  i) all varieties were reached by the 30%, ii) 
all varieties were reached by the 50%, iii) all other possible combinations.
In summary, we have a balanced panel with 155 car models for 
which we have consistent data on prices and sales. Of the car models for 
which the tax reached at least one variety, in 4 cases the tax rate was in all 
cases 30%, in 51 was always 50%, and in the remaining 42 cases there is 
a mix of situations. For the year 2014, when the tax was in force, we have 
1860 observations, with 696 corresponding to cases where no variety fell 
under the tax, 972 observations where all varieties for a given car model 
were reached by the tax, and 192 observations with a mixed situation, some 
varieties reached by the tax while others were not. Finally, because in 243 
observations we have zero sales, and because our dependent variable is 
measured in logs, the sample we work with is 3477 observations.9  
III. Empirical methodology and results
To obtain a first estimate of the impact of the internal tax on sales, 
we apply a Difference-in-Difference (DD) equation of the following form:
where Sit are sales of model i in month t,  d2014 is a dummy variable 
for the year 2014 that captures aggregate factors that would cause changes 
in Sit even in the absence of the implementation of the tax in that year, dT is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if car model i was subject to the tax (belongs 
to the treated group), which captures possible differences between the treat-
ment and control groups before the tax, dPCA is a dummy variable equal to 
1 for car models of which some varieties were included in the ProCreAuto 
plan, implemented between July and December 2014 under which the gov-
ernment subsidized the interest rate on loans to buy some locally produced 
models, uit is an error term assumed to be i.i.d. Our coefficient of interest 
is α3, which measures the difference in the average changes in sales for the 
treated and control groups because of the tax:
We also modify equation (1) accordingly to allow α3 to vary depend-
ing on the month of 2014, car maker, and the tax rate.
A potential drawback of equation (1) is that it does not allow to con-
trol for the unobserved heterogeneity amongst car models since it assumes 
that within each group, treated and not treated, there is no heterogeneity. 
Since our dataset has a panel structure, with car models observed in 2013 
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9. Our sample represents 96% of sales in 2013 and 92% in 2014. We exclude models with very small 
and intermittent sales in both years, but more important, we exclude models that were introduced 
to the market later in 2013, as well as those that were withdrawn early in 2014. In the first case it 
appears the Ford K (2.5% of sales in 2013), while in the second case two models stand out: Toyota 
Etios (3.9% of sales in 2014) and Citroen C4 Lounge (1.3% of sales in 2014). 
( )0 1 2014 2 3 2014 4ln it T T PCA itS d d d d d uα α α α α= + + + × + +
α̂  3 = Average change in E (ln Sit | dT =1, dPCA) 
      - Average change in E (ln Sit | dT =0, dPCA) 
(1)
before the implementation of the tax and also in 2014 when the tax was in 
force, to account for the unobserved heterogeneity among car models, we 
also estimate a fixed effect model:
ln Sit =β.diT + ϕdPCA + λt + ηi + uit
where λt is a monthly effect, ηi is a car model fixed effect, and diT  
(=d2014 x dT) is a dummy variable equal to 1 in all months of the year 2014 
if car model i was subject to the tax, and 0 otherwise. Similarly to equation 
(1), the coefficient β is the difference-in-difference estimator but now it dif-
ferentiates the means of the same units over time (Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2007). As before, we also adapt equation (2) to allow coefficient β to vary 
depending on the month of 2014, car maker, and the tax rate. As pointed out 
before, an advantage of equation (2) over (1) is the former allows to control 
for the unobserved heterogeneity among car models, and by the inclusion 
of a set of monthly effects we can control for the heterogeneity over time of 
changes in aggregate factors that may have affected the whole market.
Both previous specifications are aimed at answering the question of 
what was the effect of the tax on car models reached by the tax (the treated 
group) vis a vis car models that because their prices were unreached (the 
untreated group). However, another important and different question is to 
what extent the tax also affected unreached car models, compared to the 
hypothetical situation in which the tax had not existed. Here we can expect 
the effect to go in either direction. For instance, if reached and unreached 
car models are close substitutes, we could expect a positive effect on sales 
of cheaper cars that fell short of the tax thresholds. On the contrary, if the 
implementation of the tax had a depressing effect on the whole market, then 
all car models, even those that were not reached by the tax, would have seen 
their sales diminished.
To answer to this last question, we compare the aggregate evolution 
of sales of car models that because of their prices were not reached by the 
tax (which constitutes now the pseudo treated group) with three categories 
of vehicles that were left on purpose outside from the tax: light trucks, heavy 
trucks, and other heavy vehicles (these three categories constitute the un-
treated group). The intuition behind this exercise is as follows: if car models 
that were not directly reached by the tax were not affected by it, then, after 
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(2)
controlling for other factors, there should be no systematic difference in the 
evolution of sales when compared with vehicles that were excluded explic-
itly from the tax:
ln Sit =β.diT + λt + ηi + uit
In equation (3), the unit of analysis is not the car model as before, 
but aggregate sales of car models not reached by the tax, light trucks, heavy 
trucks, and other heavy vehicles, respectively. Since now we are comparing 
more heterogeneous types of vehicles than in the analysis carried out so far, 
we also extend equation (3) to allow for a specific trend for each of the four 
groups of vehicles, which helps to control for other factors that may explain 
differences in the evolution of sales not explained by the implementation of 
the tax. In this way, we relax the assumption that in the absence of the treat-
ment, the treated and untreated groups would show the same time evolution. 
However, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the four categories of 
vehicles share a common time evolution after controlling by the effect of 
the tax.10
III.1. Results
Tables 2 to 5 present the results for different specifications and esti-
mators.11 The first two columns in Tables 2 and 3 show the results from the 
Difference-in-Difference (DD) and fixed-effect panel data (PD) estimators in 
which we compare car models reached by the tax (the treated group) with car 
models that because of their prices were not reached (the untreated group). In 
column 3 (labeled Pseudo T), using a fixed-effect estimator, we compare car 
models because their prices were not reached by the tax (the pseudo treated 
group) with other vehicles that were left purposely out from the tax (the 
untreated group12)13. In Table 2, we estimate a single overall effect, while in 
Table 3, this is allowed to vary over time. In Tables 4 and 5, the comparison is 
again between reached and unreached car models, but now allowing for dif-
ferential effects according to the tax rate (Table 4) and car makers (Table 5).
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10.  These results are available from the authors upon request.
11. For a matter of space, we only report the results for the variables we are interested. The complete 
results are available upon request.
12. Trucks, heavy trucks, and other heavy vehicles.
13. We also tried with a specification that allowed for each type of vehicle to have a different time 
trend, however the null that time trends were statistically equal was not rejected. Results are 
available upon request.
(3)
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Table 2: Common effect across all dimensions
DD PD Pseudo T.
-0.2976* -0.7705*** -0.1498**
Observations 3,477 3,477 96
R-squared 0.455 0.538 0.829
Number of id 155 4
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Differential effects across time
DD PD Pseudo T.
January 2014 0.7972*** -0.3705*** 0.0636
February 2014 -0.1663 -0.6838*** -0.1935
March 2014 -0.5038*** -0.9364*** -0.1410
April 2014 -0.3121* -0.8087*** -0.0861
May-14 -0.2584 -0.8651*** -0.0622
June 2014 -0.3757** -0.8434*** -0.0657
July 2014 -0.4749*** -1.0558*** -0.0240
August 2014 -0.4720*** -1.0334*** 0.0259
September 2014 -0.3039* -0.8471*** -0.1834**
October 2014 -0.3861** -0.7056*** -0.3108**
November 2014 -0.5493*** -0.5980*** -0.4122**
December 2014 -0.7223*** -0.5166*** -0.4112**
Observations 3,477 3,477 96
R-squared 0.464 0.544 0.863
Number of id 155 4
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Differential effects across tax rates
Tax rate DD PD
30% -0.6628* -0.8022**
50% -1.0866*** -0.8548***
0/30/50% (#) 0.4726** -0.6860***
Observations 3,477 3,477
R-squared 0.493 0.539
Number of id 155
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(#) It includes car models whose varieties during the year 2014 were reached by 
different tax rates.
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The application of the tax on most expensive cars had a very impor-
tant impact on sales of models reached by the tax in comparison with those 
that because of their prices were left out. As reported in Table 2, the overall 
impact was between 25.7% (DD estimator) and 53.7% (PD estimator). But 
it also significantly affected the sales of varieties not reached by the tax 
(because of their price) in comparison with vehicles that were left purposely 
out; in this case the estimated effect is about 14%. 
Table 5: Differential effects across carmakers
 Carmaker (&) DD PD
ALFA ROMEO -1.2135*** -0.6529***
AUDI -1.2186*** -1.2890***
BMW -1.9517*** -1.1115***
CHEVROLET 0.9991 0.0904
CHRYSLER -2.2574*** -0.4071***
CITROEN -0.7268 -1.0226**
DODGE 0.5859*** -0.6494***
FORD -1.1846*** -0.0275
HONDA -0.0453 -0.3360**
HYUNDAI -0.1617 -0.3767
JEEP -0.5280* -0.6714***
KIA -0.8810* -1.1064**
MERCEDES BENZ -0.7509** -0.6209***
MITSUBISHI -0.7351*** 0.0082
NISSAN -1.3959** 0.0807
PEUGEOT 1.3567** -0.2352
PORSCHE -2.0607*** -0.6970***
RENAULT 0.4679** -0.6549**
TOYOTA 0.8705 -0.3580
VOLKSWAGEN -0.0268 -0.6633***
VOLVO -1.9952*** -0.9719***
Observations 2,875 2,875
R-squared 0.466 0.581
Number of id 125
(&) For Chery, Fiat, and Smart, no car model was reached by the tax.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
When we allow the effect to vary over time, and looking at the esti-
mates from the fixed-effect model, the magnitude of the impact is between 
31% (January 2014) and 58% (July 2014) for the comparison between 
reached and unreached car models. When the comparison is made between 
unreached car models with exempted vehicles, some differences emerge rel-
ative to the reached/unreached comparison. For this last case, the negative 
impact took place over the whole year, with the larger magnitudes during 
the period March-September 2014, especially July and August, while for 
the unreached/exempted case the estimates are negative and statistically sig-
nificant in the last four months of 2014, with the impact in November and 
December 2014 approaching that for the reached/unreached comparison. A 
possible reason for this finding is that by the end of 2014, and because of 
the increasing inflationary process Argentina was experiencing, there were 
strong expectations about an increase in the threshold prices over which 
the tax would reach a car variety. These expectations, which were later ful-
filled, could have induced a further reduction in sales of both reached and 
unreached varieties (which are closer substitutes), while a similar impact 
on exempted vehicles did not take place. It seems this was the case, with 
the drop in sales of unreached models approaching and even surpassing, in 
October 2014, that of reached models during the last months of 2014.
Finally, with regards to the effects according to the tax rate (Table 
4) and car makers (Table 5), the results are in line with what was a priori 
expected. In the first case, the negative impact on models that fell under 
the 50% tax rate is almost 40% higher than for models reached by the 30% 
rate. In the second case, it is possible to observe an important heteroge-
neity (between 3% and 77%), with car manufacturers of more expensive 
models affected harder, especially those who do not have local production 
in Argentina. For carmakers with local production, the most affected were 
Citroen (66%), Volkswagen (58%) and Renault (57%), followed by Honda, 
Peugeot, and Toyota (39%-40%), while for Ford and Chevrolet even when 
the estimated coefficients are negative, they are not statistically significant. 
In the case of Fiat, no model was reached by the tax.
IV. Summary and conclusions
As a response to an increasing outflow of foreign capital, the Ar-
gentinean government designed a set of policy measures directed to turn 
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around, or at least to reduce, the rate at which capital flows were leaving the 
country. One of the most important measures, whose implementation started 
in February 2012, was a widespread system of non-automatic import licens-
es. Another measure, which was not less controversial, was implemented 
earlier in November 2011, implying the need of having a previous approval 
to buy foreign currency, as well a tax on foreign transactions when using ei-
ther debit or credit cards, as well on the purchase of tickets for international 
travels and international tourism packages. Despite these explicit measures, 
and others that were implemented less formally (some on the edge of illegal-
ity), the outflow of foreign capital, if something did, increased continuously. 
Confronted with a scenario that was deteriorating sharply, the government 
implemented yet another measure, a tax on sales of more expensive cars, 
which in Argentina are almost completely imported. 
As a result of the new tax, but also due to other reasons, the trade 
balance of the automotive sector experienced a drastic change, going from a 
stunning USD 4.5 billion deficit in 2013 to one of just over USD 0.7 billion 
in 2014. However, as our analysis shows, the new tax had devastating effects 
on the whole market, which had reached record sales only the previous year, 
and not only on those car models that were reached by the tax, which con-
stitute a smaller share of the market. These results, which for any competent 
policymaker should not have been unforeseeable, highlight the importance 
of a careful, responsible and well-informed policy design.
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